The Committee to Enhance Topps Sends Letter to Stockholders of the Topps Company, Inc.
22 Agosto 2007 - 5:18PM
PR Newswire (US)
Calls on the Majority Members of the Topps Board to Immediately
Resign and Urges Stockholders to Vote Against the Ill-Advised and
Inadequate $9.75 Merger NEW YORK, Aug. 22 /PRNewswire/ -- The
Committee to Enhance Topps announced today that it has sent a
letter to the stockholders of The Topps Company, Inc.
(NASDAQ:TOPP). The full text of the letter follows: AN IMPORTANT
MESSAGE TO THE TOPPS COMPANY, INC. STOCKHOLDERS FROM THE COMMITTEE
TO ENHANCE TOPPS Arthur Shorin and his So-Called "Executive
Committee" Have Scared Away Upper Deck! Do Not Let Them Now Scare
You into Voting for the Ill-Advised and Inadequate $9.75 Merger!
Vote the GOLD Proxy Card Today Against the Ill-Advised Eisner
Merger! August 22, 2007 Dear Fellow Topps Stockholder: Do Not Be
Fooled! Despite what the Topps Board may be telling you, The Upper
Deck Company ("Upper Deck") withdrew its tender offer bid because
Arthur Shorin and his so-called "Executive Committee" refused to
negotiate in good-faith. We believe the Executive Committee never
had any intention of completing a deal with Upper Deck, even if it
meant the most value for the Company's stockholders. The Executive
Committee has favored the inadequate $9.75 Merger with Michael
Eisner and Madison Dearborn throughout the entire sale process
because, in our opinion, its members have interests that are not
aligned with the best interests of the Company's stockholders.
Don't just take our word for it. Here is what the Delaware Court of
Chancery and two leading independent proxy advisory firms,
Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. and Glass Lewis & Co.,
have had to say regarding the Topps Board's sale process and its
willingness to complete a deal with Upper Deck: According to the
Delaware Court: "Although [Arthur] Shorin and the other defendants
claim that they truly desire to get the highest value and want
nothing more than to get a topping bid from Upper Deck that they
can accept, their behavior belies those protestations. In reaching
that conclusion, I rely not only on the defendants' apparent
failure to undertake diligent good faith efforts at bargaining with
Upper Deck, I also rely on the misrepresentations of fact about
Upper Deck's offer that are contained in Topps's public
statements." According to Glass Lewis: "We are deeply troubled by
the process the board undertook in arriving at the proposed deal
... additionally, we believe the board has provided weak
justification for initially discontinuing negotiations with Upper
Deck during the go-shop period when Upper Deck's offer presented a
considerably higher per share price than the proposed
consideration." According to ISS: "Overall we believe the sale
process had flaws, and the company's openness to a deal with Upper
Deck was questionable." Enough is Enough! The Committee to Enhance
Topps calls on the majority members of the Topps Board to resign
their positions effective immediately. Their failures are
countless. The actions of the Executive Committee violate the most
basic principles of corporate governance and are an insult to both
corporate democracy and the Company's stockholders alike. In fact,
the track record of this Board has only worsened as the process has
dragged on. Recently, Vice Chancellor Strine of the Delaware Court
concluded that the Topps Board delivered and filed misleading proxy
materials to its stockholders and the Topps Board has further
entrenched itself by refusing, despite repeated requests, to
schedule its 2007 Annual Meeting for the election of directors in
accordance with Delaware law. The Company's stockholders deserve an
independent, non-conflicted board that will truly look out for
stockholders' best interests. The Committee has assembled a slate
of highly qualified director nominees who collectively have vast
expertise in several areas, including entertainment, confectionary,
strategic turnarounds, marketing, brand management and sports
management. The Committee Has Both a Well-Qualified Slate and a
Better Alternative for Maximizing Stockholder Value Ready if the
Inadequate Merger is Voted Down The Committee urges stockholders to
vote down the $9.75 Eisner Merger and replace the existing Topps
Board with the Committee's slate of highly qualified business
executives that, if elected, would engage in value enhancing
activities for the benefit of ALL stockholders. In particular, we
believe that Topps needs to fix its capital structure, upgrade its
senior management team and continue to improve its operations. If
elected, our nominees will conduct a modified "Dutch Auction"
tender offer to buy back $110 million of shares between $10.00 to
$10.50 per share - around 28% of the Company's shares outstanding.
Our nominees would also seek to upgrade senior management by hiring
a new CEO with extensive marketing and turnaround experience, and
who will bring a fresh perspective to the organization. We have had
discussions with potential well-qualified candidates who have the
requisite qualifications and credentials to take the Company to the
next level. Our slate of director nominees clearly demonstrates our
ability to assemble the best team possible. By contrast, Topps is
currently managed day-to-day by Scott Silverstein, the CEO's
son-in-law, a former lawyer with no business experience beyond
Topps. We Believe That Topps' Shares Could Be Worth an Enterprise
Value (net of debt) Between $16 and $18 Per Share in 2 Years By
focusing on these value-enhancing changes, the Committee believes
that Topps' shares could be worth an enterprise value (net of debt)
between $16 and $18 per share in two years, not taking into account
an M&A premium that could yield a higher valuation. We are not
the only ones who believe that there is significant intrinsic value
to be unlocked in Topps. Sean P. McGowan, an analyst at Wedbush
Morgan Securities who Forbes recently ranked #1 in the Leisure
Equipment & Products industry in its 2007 Best
Analysts-Earnings Estimators survey, stated the following in a
Research Note dated June 19, 2007 regarding a scenario in which the
Committee's director nominees are elected to the Topps Board: "We
believe that this scenario might actually have been the one that
could realize the most value over time, because we believe the
company's fortunes continue to improve and that better management
could, over a period of 18-24 months, have produced value well in
excess of $15 per share." By Voting Against the Ill-Advised $9.75
Merger, You are Not Gambling with Your Investment - You are
Protecting It! Crescendo Partners has been in Situations Like this
Before and Successfully Unlocked Value for Stockholders In 2005,
Crescendo Partners, a Computer Horizons stockholder, solicited
support against what Crescendo Partners believed to be an
ill-advised merger between Computer Horizons and Analysts
International. After the merger was voted down by Computer Horizons
stockholders at a special meeting, Crescendo Partners successfully
replaced the existing Computer Horizons Board with five new board
members, including Eric Rosenfeld. The new Computer Horizons Board
replaced management and explored all strategic alternatives
available to maximize stockholder value, which resulted in
stockholders approving a plan of liquidation and an expected
distribution of $4.68-$4.81 per share, a return of about 60% since
Crescendo Partners first became involved. Crescendo Partners has
also successfully changed management in other public companies
where we had board representation, including Emergis, Inc., Ad Opt
Technologies, Inc., Spar Aerospace Ltd. and Sierra Systems Group,
Inc., resulting in subsequent increases in stockholder value. The
$9.75 Merger is Simply Inadequate! The Committee urges stockholders
to vote down the Eisner Merger because we believe that: -- the
$9.75 per share Merger consideration is inadequate; -- the process
that led to the signing of the Eisner Merger Agreement was flawed;
and -- a better alternative exists for maximizing stockholder
value. Eisner's $9.75 offer price represents a meager 3% premium to
the average closing price of the shares for the 20 trading days
preceding the announcement of the Eisner Merger and was obtained
through a flawed sale process. The Topps Board did not shop the
Company prior to signing the Eisner Merger to get the highest
possible price for stockholders but instead was satisfied to sell
the business at an inadequate price to a buyer who promised to keep
management in place. We Urge the Company to Hold the Special
Meeting on August 30th Without Further Delay! The Company has
already postponed the special meeting by more than two months
because it was forced by the Delaware Court to correct material
omissions and materially misleading statements in its proxy
statement. The Company should not be allowed to further postpone
the special meeting in the event that the voting results are not to
its liking, as might be done in a "banana republic." It is time to
let the stockholders vote! PROTECT YOUR INVESTMENT TODAY BY VOTING
AGAINST THE ILL-ADVISED EISNER MERGER! VOTE THE GOLD PROXY CARD
TODAY! If you have any questions, please feel to call us directly
at (212) 319- 7676. You may also call D.F. King & Co., Inc.,
which is assisting the Committee, toll-free at (800) 628-8532.
Sincerely yours, Eric Rosenfeld & Arnaud Ajdler The Committee
to Enhance Topps CERTAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING THE PARTICIPANTS
The Committee to Enhance Topps (the "Committee"), together with the
other participants named below, has made a definitive filing with
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") of a proxy
statement, a proxy supplement and an accompanying proxy card to be
used to solicit votes in connection with the solicitation of
proxies against a proposed merger between The Topps Company, Inc.
(the "Company") and a buyout group that includes Madison Dearborn
Partners, LLC, and an investment firm controlled by Michael Eisner,
which will be voted on at a meeting of the Company's stockholders
(the "Merger Proxy Solicitation"). Crescendo Advisors ("Crescendo
Advisors"), together with the other participants named below,
intends to make a preliminary filing with the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") of a proxy statement and an
accompanying proxy card to be used to solicit votes for the
election of its nominees at the 2007 annual meeting of stockholders
of Topps (the "Annual Meeting Proxy Solicitation"). THE COMMITTEE
AND CRESCENDO ADVISORS ADVISE ALL STOCKHOLDERS OF THE COMPANY TO
READ THE PROXY STATEMENT, AND OTHER PROXY MATERIALS, INCLUDING
PROXY SUPPLEMENTS, IN CONNECTION WITH EACH OF THE MERGER PROXY
SOLICITATION AND THE ANNUAL MEETING PROXY SOLICITATION AS THEY
BECOME AVAILABLE BECAUSE THEY WILL CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION.
SUCH PROXY MATERIALS WILL BE AVAILABLE AT NO CHARGE ON THE SEC'S
WEB SITE AT http://www.sec.gov/. IN ADDITION, THE PARTICIPANTS IN
THE PROXY SOLICITATIONS WILL PROVIDE COPIES OF THE PROXY STATEMENT
WITHOUT CHARGE UPON REQUEST. REQUESTS FOR COPIES SHOULD BE DIRECTED
TO THE PARTICIPANTS' PROXY SOLICITOR, D.F. KING & CO., INC. AT
ITS TOLL-FREE NUMBER: (800) 628-8532. The participants in the
Merger Proxy Solicitation are Crescendo Advisors LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company ("Crescendo Advisors"), Crescendo
Partners II, L.P., Series Y, a Delaware limited partnership
("Crescendo Partners II"), Crescendo Investments II, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company ("Crescendo Investments II"),
Crescendo Partners III, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership
("Crescendo Partners III"), Crescendo Investments III, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company ("Crescendo Investments III"),
Eric Rosenfeld, Arnaud Ajdler and The Committee to Enhance Topps
(the "Merger Proxy Solicitation Participants"). The participants in
the Annual Meeting Proxy Solicitation include the Merger Proxy
Solicitation Participants, together with Timothy E. Brog, John J.
Jones, Michael Appel, Jeffrey D. Dunn, Charles C. Huggins, Thomas
E. Hyland, Thomas B. McGrath and Michael R. Rowe (the "Annual
Meeting Proxy Solicitation Participants"). Together, the Merger
Proxy Solicitation Participants and the Annual Meeting Proxy
Solicitation Participants are referred to herein as the
"Participants." Crescendo Advisors beneficially owns 100 shares of
common stock of the Company. Crescendo Partners II beneficially
owns 2,568,200 shares of common stock of the Company. As the
general partner of Crescendo Partners II, Crescendo Investments II
may be deemed to beneficially own the 2,568,200 shares of the
Company beneficially owned by Crescendo Partners II. Crescendo
Partners III beneficially owns 126,500 shares of common stock of
the Company. As the general partner of Crescendo Partners III,
Crescendo Investments III may be deemed to beneficially own the
126,500 shares of the Company beneficially owned by Crescendo
Partners III. Eric Rosenfeld may be deemed to beneficially own
2,694,900 shares of the Company, consisting of 100 shares held by
Eric Rosenfeld and Lisa Rosenfeld JTWROS, 2,547,700 shares Mr.
Rosenfeld may be deemed to beneficially own by virtue of his
position as managing member of Crescendo Investments II, 126,500
shares Mr. Rosenfeld may be deemed to beneficially own by virtue of
his position as managing member of Crescendo Investments III and
100 shares Mr. Rosenfeld may be deemed to beneficially own by
virtue of his position as managing member of Crescendo Advisors.
Mr. Ajdler beneficially owns 2,301 shares of the Company. Timothy
E. Brog beneficially owns 133,425 shares of common stock of the
Company, John J. Jones beneficially owns 2,301 shares of common
stock of the Company, and none of Michael Appel, Jeffrey D. Dunn,
Charles C. Huggins, Thomas E. Hyland, Thomas B. McGrath and Michael
R. Rowe beneficially own any shares of common stock of the Company.
DATASOURCE: The Committee to Enhance Topps CONTACT: D.F. King &
Co., Inc., 1-800-628-8532
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